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School mathematics and its everyday other?  
Revisiting Lave’s ‘Cognition in Practice’ 
 
Abstract. In the last three decades there have been a variety of studies of what is 
often referred to as ‘everyday’ or ‘street’ mathematics.  These studies have 
documented a rich variety of arithmetic practices involved in activities such as 
tailoring, carpet laying, dieting, or grocery shopping. More importantly, these studies 
have helped to rectify outmoded models of rationality, cognition, and (school) 
instruction.  
Despite these important achievements, doubts can be raised about the ways in which 
theoretical conclusions have been drawn from empirical materials. Furthermore, while 
these studies rightly criticised prevalent theories of rationality and cognition as too 
simplistic to account for everyday activities, it seems that some of the proposed 
alternatives suffer from similar flaws (i.e., are straightforward inversions of the to-be-
opposed theories, rather than more nuanced views on complicated issues).  
In this article we illustrate our sceptical view by discussing four case studies in Jean 
Lave’s pioneering and influential ‘Cognition in Practice’ (1988). By looking at the 
case studies in detail, we investigate how Lave’s conclusions relate to the empirical 
materials and offer alternative characterisations.  In particular, we question whether 
the empirical studies demonstrate the existence of two different kinds of mathematics 
(‘everyday’ and ‘school’, or ‘formal’ and ‘informal’) and whether school instruction 
tries to replace the former with the latter. 
 
Keywords. everyday mathematics; street mathematics; school mathematics; situated 
learning; Lave 
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Introduction 
In the last three decades there have been a variety of studies of what is alternatively 
referred to as ‘everyday’ mathematics (Lave, 1988), ‘street’ mathematics (Nunes, 
Schliemann, and Carraher, 1993), ‘ethnomathematics’ (D’Ambrosio, 1985), or ‘out-
of-school’ mathematics (Masingila, 1993). Influential studies have investigated the 
use of arithmetic by dieters and shoppers (Lave, 1988), Brazilian street vendors 
(Nunes et al., 1993), candy sellers (Saxe, 1991), and South African carpenters 
(Millroy, 1992). Studies of street mathematics continue to be done (for example, 
Jurdak and Shahin, 1999; Noss, Pozzi, and Hoyles, 1999; Hoyles, Noss, and Pozzi, 
2001; Gainsburg, 2006; for a detailed overview see Presmeg, 2007) – along with 
reflection on and debate over them (cf., Brenner and Moschkovich, 2002; Rowlands 
and Carson, 2002).  
In our view, these studies can be read in (at least) two different ways: firstly, as 
predominantly descriptive studies documenting a variety of mathematical practices 
dealing with practical problems in concrete situations; secondly, but more 
importantly, as evidence in the prosecution of a much larger critical campaign, which 
wants to re-assess fundamental questions about the nature of mathematics, cognition, 
and rationality.   
Our aim in this paper is raise doubts about whether successful connections are made 
between the empirical studies and these grander (critical) themes. We first summarise 
some main points of our argument, arguing that the key issue concerns the way in 
which general critical implications are drawn from specific case studies. We then 
review a leading and influential example, Jean Lave’s studies of everyday 
mathematics. We chose this example, because her studies were pioneering and 
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continue to be widely and approvingly quoted – not only in educational studies (see 
Henning, 2004), but also in other fields such as economics (Mousavi and Garrison, 
2003), organisation studies (Callon and Muniesa, 2005), accounting (Vollmer, 2007), 
and social studies of science (Bowker and Star, 1999; Verran, 2001). That is to say, 
Lave’s studies made a strategic contribution to the formation of the discourse of 
‘everyday mathematics’ and set a precedent as to how to interpret case studies. 
Furthermore, her studies are among the most extensively documented in the field.  
Since our argument concerns the detailed fit between case study materials and the 
implications drawn from them, it is impossible to develop our case without reviewing 
the details of fieldwork reports.  Within a single paper only a few studies can be 
reviewed, and we focus on Lave’s studies since they seem a pivotal contribution to a 
subsequently thriving strand of inquiry. That Lave’s work is early in this approach 
does not mean it is outdated, for Lave’s case studies seem no less robust, and often 
more detailed, than many of their successors, which nonetheless report much the same 
kind of conclusions.  Nor have the problems that we find with Lave’s studies been 
surpassed by her successors through improved forms of interpretation, and the themes 
of later studies are in general harmony with Lave’s. Thus although Lave’s studies 
were conducted some years ago, they still constitute a perspicuous site for posing the 
questions we think need to be asked.   
The motivation of studies of ‘everyday’ mathematics 
Why did studies of everyday or street mathematics have such an impact on 
mathematics education and other fields such as cultural anthropology or cognitive 
science? In our view the main contribution of these studies was that they illustrated 
the variety of arithmetic procedures that have been developed as part of, for example, 
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supermarket shopping, tailoring, carpet laying, or candy selling – thereby deflating the 
idea that mathematical competences can only be acquired by attending (Western) 
schools. In short, these studies ‘discovered’ mathematics in both non-Western 
‘traditional’ societies as well as the ‘academic hinterland’ (Lave, 1988, p. 3) of the 
West. 
However, this descriptive aspect alone cannot account for the wide-reaching impact 
that these studies had. To understand this influence, one has to see these studies as 
part of a critical project that was a reaction against then prevailing theoretical regimes 
of rationalism, cognitivism, and formalism in the social and human sciences.  These 
studies thus can be seen as (1) a reaction against the way that rationality was 
conceived (especially in cultural anthropology); (2) a critique of the cognitivist 
conceptions of learning and knowledge (with its focus on the individual and its 
neglect of the situation); and (3) an expression of the view that (Western) schools play 
a key role in transmitting these preconceptions about rationality and thereby alienate 
large parts of the society.  
Firstly, studies of everyday and street mathematics, especially those conducted in 
‘non-developed’ or ‘traditional’ societies, can be seen as a reaction against the  
supposedly dominant view that (Western) science and mathematics are the hallmark 
of rationality, i.e., are superior to other forms of human knowledge. According to this 
view, mathematics is the supreme embodiment of rationality:  
Problem solving through the use of mathematics has become a cultural   
symbol for human rationality and ‘right’ thinking and is often considered 
the underlying mechanism of thought itself. (de la Rocha, 1986, p. xii) 
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Consequently, cultures without professional mathematics were seen as inferior to 
Western cultures: 
Nonliterate peoples are often explicitly characterized as simpleminded or 
childlike, as only capable of concrete thought and not of abstraction or 
generalization, as of lesser intelligence, as incapable of analytic thought, 
and as without formal reasoning or logic. In any context these descriptions 
are heavily judgemental; in the context of mathematics, they are 
condemning. (Ascher and Ascher, 1986, p. 128) 
Studies of everyday/street mathematics attempted to counter the equation ‘being 
rational = being good at formal (Western) mathematics’.  By demonstrating that even 
in cultures with no professional mathematics a wide variety of mathematical 
procedures have been developed as part of practices such as carpentry, tailoring, or 
candy selling, these studies demonstrated that ‘traditional’ cultures are by no means 
intellectually inferior to Western culture.  
A second aim of studies of everyday and street mathematics was to attack the way 
that cognitive science conceived of understanding and learning by comparing the 
mind to a computer and reasoning to the running of a computerised algorithm.  This 
conception was markedly individualist (determined to understand the general and 
formal properties of the individual mind) and acontextual (attempting to isolate 
individuals from all external influences by placing them in experimental laboratories). 
The cognitive science view of cognition and learning thus nestled very comfortably 
with assumptions about the supposed supremacy of formal (mathematical) reasoning. 
The idea of ‘everyday cognition’ (Rogoff and Lave, 1984), which feeds into that of 
‘everyday mathematics’, challenged the idea that actual reasoning (as opposed to 
artificially restricted laboratory exercises) can be represented by formal computational 
schemes.  ‘Everyday cognition’ also opposed individualism (by shifting the emphasis 
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to the socio-cultural milieu) and acontextualism (by emphasising the situated 
character of learning and cognition).  
A third aim of these studies had to do with school mathematics and the view that the 
aforementioned ideas about rationality permeate the teaching of mathematics to 
schoolchildren. In other words, cognitivist or formalistic conceptions of rationality 
were seen as having been ‘institutionalised’ in Western schools (see, e.g., Lave, 1990, 
p. 310; Lave, 1993, p. 24). As Taylor (1996, p. 163) puts it: “modern school 
mathematics continues to be influenced strongly by the rationalist myth of cold 
reason”. Schools were thus seen as perpetuating an ideology of mathematics as 
definitive of rationality with the result that those doing badly in school mathematics 
see themselves not just failing at a particular subject in school, but as being generally 
less ‘intelligent’. Studies of everyday mathematics demonstrated that people who do 
not perform well in school mathematics (and therefore might think that they can’t do 
mathematics) are frequently efficient and successful in solving these everyday and 
street problems (i.e., ‘really’ can do mathematics).  These studies aimed to highlight 
the alienating effects of classroom instruction and to establish that the acquisition of 
rationality does not require schooling.   
Since we are critical of some of the claims that are made on the basis of studies of 
everyday mathematics, we emphasise that we too oppose the identified intellectual 
targets (cognitivism and formalism) of these studies.  However, we are less than 
sanguine about the way the opposition to these theoretical positions is realised 
through the case studies. We wonder whether the interpretations of studies of 
everyday/street mathematics exhibit an overreaction against the theories that they 
want to attack, leading them to assert the direct opposite to them. However, if the to-
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be-opposed theory is simplistic and naïve, then its direct opposite will be 
correspondingly simplistic and naïve. We therefore argue that the importance of 
studies of everyday mathematics is limited because their interpretive function is 
largely restricted to flat denials of very simplistic theories – where it is often not clear 
whether the opponents really hold such simple views.  As Pea (1991, p. 484), 
reviewing Lave (1988), observed: 
Nevertheless, other arguments may, to many readers, border on caricatures 
of the disciplines under critique, as when cognitive psychology is 
designated as ‘functionalist’ in its core orientation to mind as a ‘self-
perpetuating, closed, input-output system’. 
If one does not start with a view that only doing mathematics counts as thinking and 
that the only way that mathematics can be learned is through formal schooling, then 
many of the findings of these studies become not wrong, but uncontroversial and 
commonplace. These studies did record that: 
 the calculations in everyday situations are not undertaken for their own sake 
but in service of practical activities;   
 the calculations that people encounter in many everyday situations typically 
involve small and ‘round’ numbers; 
 the most usual arithmetic practices are addition, subtraction, and 
multiplication of ‘simple’ numbers (e.g., doubling or trebling); 
 where calculation is called for in everyday situations, it does not take the form 
of the (school-taught) pencil-and-paper application of a place-holding 
algorithm; 
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 instead, most calculation involves the use of ‘mental arithmetic’ (which 
features such  procedures such as memorised results, rounding up, estimating, 
or approximating); 
 when we compare schooled and unschooled children, we find that they 
perform equally on the simple problems that they encounter as part of their 
everyday lives – but that schooled children perform better at complicated 
problems (‘school problems’). 
Without targeting a simplistic view of human rationality, none of these statements 
seem remotely controversial, stating facts familiar from commonplace experience in, 
for example, grocery shopping. As Carraher and Schliemann (2002, p. 133) recently 
observed: 
In retrospect, the observation that mathematical learning occurs out of 
school may seem obvious. Indeed, one might wonder how anyone could 
ever have thought otherwise!  
A fundamental question seems to be: Do studies of everyday and street mathematics 
point to the existence of two different kinds of mathematics (a formal one taught in 
school, its everyday, informal other having evolved autonomously and independently 
and being fundamentally different)?  This seems to be the view expressed in titles 
such as “Street Mathematics and School Mathematics” (Nunes et al., 1993; our 
emphasis) or “Everyday and Academic Mathematics in the Classroom” (Brenner and 
Moschkovich, 2002; our emphasis) and in quotations such as these: 
[…] recent research, mainly carried on by anthropologists, shows evidence 
of practices which are typically mathematical, such as counting, ordering, 
sorting, measuring and weighing, done in radically different ways than 
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those which are commonly taught in the school system.  (D’Ambrosio, 
1985, p. 44; our emphasis) 
[…] the chasm between school and everyday life. (Lave, 1992, p. 76; our 
emphasis) 
[…] the wide gap that exists between mathematics practice in school and 
in out-of-school situations. (Masingila, 1993, p. 18; our emphasis) 
Lave (1988) has shown how arithmetic activity in the real world does not 
reflect the formal procedures taught in the classroom. […] The gap 
between this formally taught system and the strategies needed in the world 
outside is wide. (Aubrey, 1997, p. 57; our emphasis) 
In our view the distinction between ‘school’ and ‘everyday/street’ mathematics is at 
best misleading, at worst, mistaken – and to speak of a radical or wide gap or chasm is 
hyperbole, rather than careful description. We will argue that rather than saying that 
there are two different kinds of mathematics, one could as well say that one and the 
same kind of mathematics is used differently in two different situations (it is subject 
to more ‘relaxed’ standards in many everyday situations, to ‘stricter’ ones in many 
school situations).  Evidence for such a view can be found in a recent summary:     
The goal of making everyday mathematical activities a part of classroom 
practices can be accomplished in many different ways.  It can mean 
bringing into the classroom (a) the objects of study of everyday 
mathematics, such as checkbooks to be balanced or architectural problems 
to be solved; (b) aspects of the social organisation of nonschool settings, 
such as collaboration; (c) the discursive practices of a work setting, such 
as peer reviews and evaluations; or (d) the participation structures from 
everyday activities, such as conversation, discussion, and debate. (Brenner 
and Moschkovich, 2002, p. vi; emphasis in original) 
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The new aspects of ‘everyday mathematics’ that are emphasised here are not in the 
mathematical forms of computation or their results, but in the context or purpose of 
the overall activity. The only mathematical difference that we could find evidenced in 
studies of everyday mathematics is that between doing calculations using (school-
taught) ‘place-holding algorithms written out with pen-and-paper’ and what we have 
called ‘mental arithmetic’.     
Recently there have been steps towards a more subtle view of the relationship 
between street and school mathematics.  For example, Carraher and Schliemann 
(2002, p. 134) do not speak of two different kinds of arithmetic, but point to “the 
subtle differences between arithmetic algorithms in and out of school” (our emphasis). 
With this paper we hope to contribute further to such a more nuanced view, which we 
think will result in a better understanding of what can be learned from studies of 
everyday and street mathematics.   
Case studies of ‘everyday’ mathematics 
We now look closely at four of Lave’s studies, offering an alternative characterisation 
of the materials, especially with respect to the implications the studies carry. We 
argue that Lave assembles excessively stark contrasts from relatively small and 
heterogeneous differences and that  alternative understandings of the examples are 
readily available.    
Tailoring  
Lave’s early study of the use of arithmetic by Liberian tailors (Lave 1977a,b,c, 1980, 
1982a,b, 1990; Reed and Lave, 1979) is in many ways a typical example of studies of 
arithmetic in other cultures (e.g., Gay and Cole, 1967). Lave’s study records two 
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things that cannot be challenged: firstly, that some arithmetic competence can be 
learned without schooling; secondly, those who attend school learn some arithmetic 
competences that are not so easily picked up in out-of-school situations.  
Lave studied sixty-three tailors who were given arithmetic problems, half involving 
numbers and problems actually encountered in their daily work (‘tailoring problems’), 
half involving problems of equal difficulty that were rarely encountered in their work 
(‘nontailoring problems’). According to Lave, tailors with no schooling solved on 
average 91% of the former and 70% of the latter, while tailors with 5-10 years of 
schooling averaged 95% and 91% respectively (Lave, 1977a, p. 179). The message of 
this was clear: don’t presume that all arithmetic procedures used in everyday life 
originate in school; some arithmetic procedures can be picked up outside schools.  
However, another aspect, less emphasized by Lave, is that there are arithmetic 
problems (‘nontailoring problems’), where it does make a difference whether 
someone has attended school or not (91% versus 70% success rate). What this 
suggests is that only certain kinds of arithmetic procedures are picked up in tailoring. 
This is confirmed through Lave’s ethnographic observations, where she specifies the 
limited range of arithmetic procedures employed in tailoring: 
Through observation and participation in the activities of the tailor shop, 
we found that tailors must be able to read off inches on the tape measure; 
measure various lengths; and quarter, halve, double, and quadruple 
measurements as they cut out the four main pieces of a pair of trousers 
before assembling them into a finished product. Multiplying and dividing 
by 2 and 4 are therefore by far the most common operations. (Reed and 
Lave, p. 581, endnote 3) 
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In other words, tailors do not encounter a wide range of arithmetic operations, but 
only a small range of them.  
Dieting  
After studying the use of arithmetic in another culture, the Adult Math Project (AMP) 
investigated arithmetic practices in American culture, for example, as part of dieting 
(de la Rocha, 1985, 1986; Lave, 1986a,b, 1988, 1990; Lave, de la Rocha, Faust, 
Murtaugh, and Migalski, 1982; Lave, Murtaugh, and de la Rocha,  1984). This study 
demonstrated that people can be inventive in developing purpose-built arithmetic 
applications for activities that interest them. It also showed, like the tailoring study, 
that the kinds of problems encountered are of a narrow range.  However, in the 
discussion of these findings, we also find the more problematic tendency to 
exaggerate differences in order to create stark contrasts (e.g., between ‘formal’ and 
‘informal’, or between ‘quantitative’ and ‘non-quantitative’). 
Lave’s collaborator de la Rocha investigated Weight Watcher dieters’ use of 
arithmetic (i.e., their calculations and measurements).  The calculations necessary for 
dieting “were very simple, arithmetically speaking” (de la Rocha, 1986, p. 17) and 
dieters employed a variety of ‘calculating devices’: 
They measure a precise amount of food and transfer the measured amount 
to a glass or bowl. Once the measured food is in its container, they note its 
position relative to some feature of the container such as a decorative 
pattern. By using the same glass or bowl over and over, and always filling 
it to the same position, they eliminate the need for continual measuring. 
(de la Rocha, 1985, p. 194) 
Like the tailoring study, this provided a basis for a critique of simplistic accounts of 
mathematics: if you think that there is only one way of measuring in the world, think 
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again! People are incredibly inventive in devising purpose-specific solutions to their 
arithmetic problems.  Dieters do not employ ‘universal’ (manufactured) measuring 
devices for every measurement they have to do, and they try to avoid repeated 
measurements by ‘storing’ the appropriate amounts in purpose-specific devices. These 
rather uncontroversial observations are, however, seen to point to two different kinds 
of procedures, ‘universal’ or ‘formal’ ones (that are presumably taught in school) and 
‘everyday’ or ‘informal’ ones: 
[…] many problems that might have been solved by quantitative means 
were solved in non-quantitative ways that accomplished the same end. For 
example, an old cracked coffee cup became ‘my rice cup’ and replaced the 
standard measuring cup in the preparation of rice, a circumstance leading 
to the disappearance of numbers from the preparation process. (de la 
Rocha, 1986, p. 18) 
In our view the contrast between ‘quantitative’ and ‘non-quantitative’ means is 
exaggerated and possibly misleading, since it seems to mischaracterise the measuring 
done through ‘my rice cup’. We would argue that using ‘my rice cup’ to measure rice 
is still ‘quantitative’ measuring, since it measures the same quantity as the standard 
measuring cup (it replaces the measuring device, not the system of measurement). 
Obviously, there is a big difference between ‘measuring’ and ‘estimating’ (rather than 
using any measuring device, a dieter may just estimate how much 100g of rice might 
be), but this is not the same as the difference between a ‘universal’ and ‘specific’ 
measuring device (i.e., between a manufactured measuring cup and ‘my rice cup’).  
Estimating could be said to lead “to the disappearance of numbers from the 
preparation process”, but the use of ‘my rice cup’ does not, since it retains the 
knowledge that ‘my rice cup’ numbers the correct quantity of rice.  If ‘my rice cup’ 
holds 100g and a recipe requires 200g of rice, the dieter need not resort to the 
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standard measuring device, but can simply figure that the recipe calls for two ‘rice 
cups’. The initial measuring operation is presupposed in the use of the rice cup and 
the absence of further mention of numbers of grams (replaced by, possibly, multiples 
of rice cups) does not ‘eradicate numbers’ from the process. Similarly, when dieters in 
the supermarket shop for items in a size that equals the Weight Watchers serving size 
(de la Rocha, 1985, p. 197), this is not a ‘non-quantitative’ but a ‘quantitative’ 
method.   
In sum, de la Rocha’s study demonstrates that dieters have ways of customising their 
measurements to make them more efficient or convenient (e.g., avoiding the need to 
make repeated measurements by ‘storing’ the first measurement in a specific device).  
However, these considerations do not point to a contrast in terms of ‘quantitative’ 
versus ‘non-quantitative’ methods (which, in our view, stands for formal/school 
versus informal/everyday).  In other words, the ‘informal’, ‘everyday’ methods that 
dieters came up with do not stand in any way in conflict or contradiction with 
‘generic’, ‘universal’ ways of measuring. The study exhibits that these different ways 
of measuring measure standard amounts and that dieters are aware of their 
equivalence (using first a ‘universal’ measuring device, subsequently replaced by ‘my 
rice cup’). 
Money-management  
The tendency to create stark contrasts from small differences is also illustrated by the 
study of money-management in households conducted by Katherine Faust (reported 
in, e.g., Lave, 1988; Lave et al., 1982), which  described some ways in which money 
is handled in families, in particular, the variety of ‘stashes’ people create to handle 
their money:  
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Money […] is brought into the family as income, held temporarily by 
various compartmentalized means (‘stashes’), and finally used to meet 
expenditures. The flow of money occurs in varied media of exchange, 
including cash, checks, and credit cards […]. (Lave, 1988, p. 131) 
Just as dieters’ use of measuring devices is tied to recurrent practical problems, so 
household income is organised in terms of specific purposes (day-to-day-expenses, 
‘treats’, savings for children’s future education, etc.). These commonplace 
observations are used to create yet another contrast, between ‘universal’ and ‘non-
universal’ uses of money. Thus, on the one hand, Lave (1988, p. 131) argues that 
“Western cultures have a universal monetary system and medium of exchange that in 
principle provides a universal standard”. On the other hand, she finds that: 
Incoming funds shaped into stashes and by media for transactions, are 
used to create, in practice, special purpose monies. It will be argued here 
that they are used to create categories that may not be treated as 
equivalent, and that these prohibitions have the same moral character as 
those surrounding special purposes monies in other societies. Participants 
in the AMP gave the impression that a universal standard of value and 
medium of exchange was not an advantage […]. (pp. 131-132; emphasis 
in original) 
It seems that Lave treats the ‘special purpose monies’ as a counter-example to the 
supposed universality of money.  In other words, Lave seems to think that budgeting 
conflicts with the ‘universal’ role of money. However, Lave gives a rather misleading 
picture of what the universality of money in Western culture involves. If we 
understand by this the requirement that money is, within the currency domain, a 
universal medium of exchange, then we do not see that special purpose monies in any 
way detracts from the universality of money, but in fact presupposes it.  In other 
words, there is no evidence that people suppose that money is non-interchangeable 
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between one stash and another (i.e., that one cannot borrow a ten dollar bill from the 
‘mad money’ stash to add to the day-to-day expenses stash). Of course, monetarily 
equivalent amounts can have very different significances: ten dollars for a six year old 
is different from ten dollars to a thirty-year old investment banker; four hundred 
dollars to pay the mortgage is different from four hundred dollars spent on a lunch. 
The differences that Lave describes are not in numerical value of the currency or its 
purchasing power, but in respect of the relativity of terms like ‘large’ or ‘expensive’ 
to the financial circumstances (specified in terms of the usual numerical and value 
currency equivalents) of the individual. Ten dollars is a large amount to a small child, 
but not for an investment banker. A four hundred dollar lunch may be expensive, 
while a four hundred dollar monthly mortgage might be small. How we judge the 
meaning or practical utility of ten dollars depends on the situation.  
Lave seems to be contrasting two different views of money, the ‘universalist’ (formal) 
and the ‘non-universalist’ (informal), attributing the former view to theorists and the 
latter to ‘just plain folks’.  In contrast, we would argue that the ‘universality’ of 
money is presupposed by all participants (since having accounts dedicated to specific 
purposes does not deprive the money thus stored of its standard exchange function).  
What we have been trying to show is that studies of everyday mathematics (not just 
Lave’s) tend to create strong contrasts, but often do not take the time to spell out the 
exact nature of the implied contrast.  In this case, Lave argues that her study critiques 
the idea of money as a universal standard, but this is only so in a very limited (and 
rather misleading) sense: people’s organisation of money is not ‘universal’ (i.e., equal 
across different people and situations), but nothing in Lave’s study needs to be seen as 
counterevidence to what economists consider the universal exchangeability of money. 
Page 18 of 40 
Greiffenhagen, C. and W. Sharrock (2008). School mathematics and its everyday other? Revisiting 
Lave's 'Cognition in Practice'. Educational Studies in Mathematics 69 (1), 1-21. 
 
Supermarket shopping 
The most famous study of the Adult Math Project, an analysis of the arithmetic 
procedures used as part of grocery shopping, was conducted by Michael Murtaugh 
(Lave 1982b, 1986a,b, 1988; Lave et al., 1982, 1984; Murtaugh 1984, 1985a,b).  This 
study mirrors the results from the other studies: the range of arithmetic problems 
encountered as part of grocery shopping is limited, but shoppers are successful at 
performing the calculations that do occur. Our aim, again, is to show how the 
ethnographic project is used to create a misleading contrast between ‘everyday’ and 
‘school’ arithmetic.  
Twenty-five adult grocery shoppers were accompanied on shopping trips. Since one 
tape was lost (Murtaugh, 1984, p.245), the data reported in the study concerns 24 
shoppers1. This is the summary: 
Of 803 grocery items purchased by 24 shoppers, 312 involved explicit 
problem solving through consideration of alternative brands and sizes. Of 
these 312 cases, 125 involved some arithmetic calculation; this 
represented about 16% of the total items purchased. Most of these cases – 
77 in all – involved price comparisons among different brands within the 
same product-class. […] In only four of the 77 cases did the shopper 
proceed to select the more expensive alternative. (pp. 81-82) 
Perhaps the most important thing to note is that almost two thirds of the items 
purchased in the supermarket were bought ‘without thinking’ / ‘automatically’ and 
                                                 
1 Unfortunately, the reported numbers are not consistent throughout the reviewed articles. That is to 
say, there are differences between, for example, Lave et al. (1984), Lave (1988), and Murtaugh 
(1985a), which makes a clear understanding of what the study actually shows slightly problematic.  
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only a very small number of items purchased (16%) involved any arithmetic 
‘calculation’. In a sense, then, these findings demonstrate that there is very little 
arithmetic in grocery shopping and that most of it is routine. This impression is 
enforced if we consult the table of “frequencies of arithmetic usage by grocery 
shoppers” (Murtaugh, 1985b, p. 187): 
 Price Comparisons 180 
 simple comparison 102 
 with coupon 10 
 quantity comparison 3 
 ‘best buy’ calculation 65 
 
 
 Nonprice Comparisons 33 
 number of items 11 
 other 22 
 
We would argue that comparing the price of two items of equal size in order to buy 
the cheaper one (‘simple comparison’) is at best a borderline case of ‘calculation’.  
The same applies to comparing the unit price displayed below items of different sizes, 
which was done in 16 of the 65 ‘best buy’ cases (Murtaugh, 1985b, p. 189). Although 
these comparisons involve numbers, they do not involve ‘calculation’ (unless seeing 
that one number is bigger than another is counted as a calculation). Thus as far as we 
can tell from these numbers, it seems that only 49 out of the 803 cases (6%) involved 
what might typically be called a ‘calculation’.  
This important fact is seldom emphasized. That is to say, Lave summarises these 
observations as pointing to “a startling 98% – virtually error free – arithmetic in the 
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supermarket” (Lave et al., 1984, p. 822), a statement frequently repeated in the 
literature (e.g., Aubrey, 1997, p. 57; Harris, 1997, p. 199; Pozzi, Noss, and Hoyles, 
1998, p. 106; Hoyles et al., 2001, p. 7; Civil, 2002, p. 43; Mousavi and Garrison, 
2003, p. 148) – without emphasising that this applies to only 49 cases of mostly very 
basic calculation3.  We would argue that a more accurate summary would be to say 
that it demonstrated the complete absence of anything but elementary arithmetic from 
the supermarket. 
We do not deny that the supermarket study could be used to correct claims that argue 
that schooling is an indispensable prerequisite for successful shopping. However, we 
wonder whether the shoppers’ achievements are exaggerated (since the low frequency 
and limited range of the encountered problems is rarely stressed) and used to force a 
contrast between shoppers’ ‘informal’ and schools’ ‘formal’ methods.  This can be 
seen in the way that the success rate of shoppers in the supermarket is compared with 
that on a pen-and-paper test: 
We compared shoppers’ arithmetic in the supermarket with their 
performance on an extensive paper-and-pencil arithmetic test, covering 
integer, decimal, and fraction arithmetic, and using addition, subtraction, 
multiplication, and division operations, based on a test from the Torque 
                                                 
2 We are unsure how Lave et al. arrive at this number (98%). 73 out of 77 ‘best buy’ calculations 
would be 95%, while 121 out of 125 arithmetic calculations would be 97%.  
3 Thus we would argue that the following summary is seriously misleading, since it suggests that the 
shoppers performed several hundred calculations (rather than only 49 of them, which they solved 
correctly): “In several hundred grocery items purchased under observation by the Adult Math Project, 
98% of the calculations were correct.” (Lave, 1986b, 147) 
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Project at MIT. The twenty-five shoppers varied in the amount of their 
schooling and in the time since their schooling was completed. Their 
scores averaged 59% on the arithmetic test, compared with a startling 98% 
– virtually error free – arithmetic in the supermarket. (Lave et al., 1984, p. 
82) 
This is perhaps the most famous ‘finding’ of Lave, again frequently cited in the 
literature (e.g., Roth, 1992, p. 629; Devlin, 1999; Belzen, 2000, p. 9; de Abreu, 2002, 
p. 331; Sato, 2004, p. 32; Orton, 2004, p. 122). However, we think that the success of 
everyday or street mathematics is overstated, since it is by no means clear that the 
59% and 98% success rates are comparable.  
We have already pointed to the low frequency of actual cases of calculation in the 
supermarket. Furthermore, the kinds of calculations performed are not usually very 
complex.   That is to say, the 49 cases of proper ‘best buy’ calculation, involved 
predominantly either (a) ‘doubling’ or ‘trebling’ (Murtaugh, 1985b, p. 190) or (b) 
‘differing’, which consisted of 
calculat[ing] the difference between items on one or both dimensions and 
compare the results. For example, a shopper considered two rolls of paper 
towels, one costing 82 cents, the other 79 cents. The shopper noted the 
number of sheets in each roll, 119 versus 104, and proceeded to 
reformulate the problem, saying ‘that would be three cents more and you 
get 11 more, 15 more sheets.’ She concluded that the larger roll was 
‘probably better, a better buy’. (Murtaugh, 1985b, pp. 190-191) 
The 98% success rate thus reflects the fact that the shoppers can successfully employ 
the two and three times table and are able to add and subtract small numbers. While 
this shows that shoppers’ arithmetic competence is sufficient for shopping purposes, it 
is also clear that schools aim to teach procedures that can be used to solve a much 
wider range of problems, including more complicated ones.  Thus the paper-and-
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pencil test included more complex arithmetic problems, e.g., 975 + 987 + 956 or 437 
 305 (Lave, 1988, p. 74), which are not problems encountered as part of grocery 
shopping sums and which are more difficult to solve with mental arithmetic. Given 
that one success rate applies to a rather limited range of small number calculations, 
and the other to more complicated calculations, is it surprising that they are different? 
The different nature of an arithmetic ‘problem’ in the supermarket and an arithmetic 
problem in a school exam can further be demonstrated by the fact that shoppers 
abandon complicated calculations in the supermarket and use estimates (rather than 
precise results) – both of which are not acceptable in a school test. If a calculation 
gets complicated, shoppers just give it up: 
In supermarket arithmetic an alternative to arithmetic problem-solving is 
abandonment of the arithmetic and resolution of snags through exercise of 
other options. Abandonment of a calculation may occur when it becomes 
too complicated for solution within grocery-shopping activity in the 
supermarket setting.  (Lave et al., 1984, p. 90) 
For example, one shopper compared one type of barbecue source of 18 ounces for 
$0.89 with another of 23 ounces for $1.17 (which is quite a complicated calculation, 
not at all easy to do in one’s head). However, she did not perform the calculation, but 
simply abandoned it (Lave et al., 1984, p. 91). We do not wish to criticise shoppers 
for abandoning calculations (why would we?), but want to point out that on a paper-
and-pencil test abandoning a problem would count as a ‘failure’. 
Similarly, Lave observes that shoppers are not interested in ‘precise’ calculations but 
deal with estimates. In particular, they may only be interested whether item A offers a 
better deal than item B, but not necessarily try to calculate the exact difference. Thus 
for many purposes 59 cents becomes 60 cents and one dollar 12 cents could count as 
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one dollar (Lave et al., 1984, p. 87).  Again, there is nothing to be disapproved of in 
terms of practical activities, nor need school mathematics entail that these 
‘convenience’ measures are in any way improper in practical decision making, but 
offering these as results in a paper-and-pencil test would constitute a mistake (or at 
least a misunderstanding of the kind of operations the test was calling for). As 
Murtaugh (1985a, p. 193) himself observes that “[n]ot all of them would be 
recognized as acceptable solutions on a school arithmetic test”4. 
In sum, the supermarket study documented the kinds of arithmetic problems 
encountered as part of shopping and demonstrated that shoppers are able to solve 
them with sufficient success and precision for their practical purposes (not necessarily 
to a school-test standard of numerical precision). It also reminded us that most 
arithmetic calculations in everyday situations are done using mental arithmetic, rather 
than through pen-and-paper place-holding algorithms. However, these observations 
are subsequently exaggerated, since it is suggested that everyday mathematics (with a 
success rate of 98%) is therefore superior to school mathematics (with a success rate 
of 59%), whereas we have tried to show that these success rates are not like-for-like. 
Lave’s polemical aim is, presumably, to establish that practical activities (such as 
                                                 
4 In fact, one could argue that a different ‘success rate’ of supermarket arithmetic is buried in the 
descriptions. For example, Murtaugh (1985a, p. 193) provides us with a table of “ways of handling 
‘best buy’ problems”. Of the 61 cases, 16 would not appear in a school test (since they were solved by 
‘read unit price labels’); 15 of them would be marked as a mistake (‘ignore size difference’ and 
‘indicate inputs only’); out of the remaining 30 cases, 4 were miscalculated, leaving us with a success 
rate of 57% – even worse than the 59% success rate on the test from the Torque Project (we are simply 
trying to point to the difficulty of arriving at, and interpreting, the reported numbers). 
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shopping) are a better environment for the expression of individual competences than 
the (artificial?) setting of the classroom, but this could only be inferred from the 
differential success rates – were these accepted – at the price of overlooking that the 
main difference between the two environments is the criteria of success (not the 
relations between numbers).  
The contrast with ‘school’ mathematics 
The pivotal role of the case studies of everyday mathematics is to provide a contrast 
with school mathematics teaching. However, any genuine comparison between 
everyday applications of arithmetic and school arithmetic will be complicated, since 
the aims and purposes of teaching mathematics in schools are multiple and complex, 
and the instructional import of any moment of mathematical activity may have only 
an indirect relationship to ‘everyday problem solving’ of the sort found in everyday 
activities such as dieting or shopping. We have thus been struck by how little 
discussion about the variety of aims of school mathematics we could find in Lave’s 
papers.  We found one place in which Lave acknowledges that studies of everyday 
arithmetic pertain only to one of the many aims of schools: 
[…] it should be clear that these data speak to only one goal of school 
arithmetic instruction – the teaching of skills used in everyday life in this 
society today. Goals of preparing future engineers and physicists are not 
herein addressed; nor are the goals of teaching arithmetic structures for 
their own sake, both of which are strongly held functions of public 
education. (Lave, 1982b, p. 6) 
We think that this restriction of the possible implications of studies of everyday 
mathematics is subsequently disregarded. Instead, it seems that there is an implicit 
assumption that the most important aim and prevailing business of school 
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mathematics is to teach skills used in basic practices of everyday life. That is, the 
‘success’ of school mathematics is only evaluated by looking at whether school-
taught algorithms are used as part of everyday activities such as dieting or shopping.  
The absence of the use of these school-taught procedures is seen as evidence for the 
‘failure’ of school mathematics. However, as Dienes (1960, p. 21) observed many 
years ago: “If the requirements of everyday life determined the contents of our 
mathematics syllabuses there would surely be little mathematics in them.” 
A serious evaluation of the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of school mathematics would address 
complicated questions about the variety of different (and possibly even conflicting) 
aims of school mathematics. Rather than addressing these, Lave argues (without any 
evidence) that the main aim of school mathematics is to replace ‘everyday’ with 
‘school’ methods: 
There is a very general first assumption that it is the responsibility of 
schooling to replace the (presumably) faulty and inefficient mathematical 
knowledge acquired by people in the real world. This project is viewed as 
especially urgent in a highly technical world. (Lave, Smith, and Butler, 
1989, p. 67)  
Lave seems to suggest that schools not only teach certain algorithms, but that they 
also transmit the view (or ideology?) that these algorithms are the only permissible 
procedure in all circumstances.  In other words, Lave sees schools as teaching a 
prohibition of ‘informal’ or ‘everyday’ procedures throughout all areas of life.  This 
view of schools seems to be not uncommon, for example, both Taylor (1991, p. 110) 
and Masingila (1994, p. 430) cite Lave approvingly. 
We find this view rather implausible. However, we can get a better understanding of 
what Lave might have in mind by looking at perhaps the only detailed description of 
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“math practice in school classrooms” that we could find in her corpus (Lave, 1990, 
pp. 320-323; reproduced in Lave, 1992, pp. 81-84). This study (conducted by Michael 
Hass) analysed a three-week unit of multiplication and division in a bilingual 
Spanish/English third-grade classroom and focused “on a group of 11 children, the 
‘upper’ math group” (p. 320).  Lave provides the following summary:  
[…] in the three-week period the children were deeply engaged in math 
work during individual work time (about 75% of class time), but invested 
minimal attention and involvement in ongoing activity during the 
teacher’s instruction sessions (about 25% of class time).  During the three 
weeks the children gave no evidence of having adopted any of the specific 
strategies demonstrated by the teacher during periods of general 
instruction.  (p. 321; emphasis in original) 
For Lave, the study showed a clear contrast between methods and strategies taught by 
the teacher and those used by children, i.e., between ‘formal’ methods (that schools 
aim to teach) and ‘informal’ methods (that schools supposedly aim to replace).  
However, note that these methods again differ not in the results they produce, but in 
the ways of arriving at these results. In other words, pupils were able to solve the 
problems given to them by the teacher, since “[e]ach of the 11 turned in nearly 
errorless daily practice assignments” (p. 321). According to Lave the children did not 
use the teacher’s methods to solve the problems, but instead used “problem solving 
methods they invented or brought with them to the classroom” (p. 321). The only 
example of a ‘pupil’ procedure given by Lave is this:  
They discovered that the multiplication table printed in their book could 
be used to solve division problems, an opportunity for mathematical 
discussion of which the teacher was unaware. (p. 321) 
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We might wonder in which sense this ‘pupil’ method qualifies as a radically different 
(or even ‘conflicting’) method from that taught by the teacher. In our view, even the 
most minimal understanding of multiplication and division involves understanding 
that each operation is the inverse of the other, and it is not this that the children 
presumably discovered entirely autonomously. What the children perhaps discovered, 
and what the teacher was perhaps unaware of, was that there was a multiplication 
table in the textbook that they could use. In other words, the children discovered that 
for these problems using the multiplication table in the book was an easier method 
than using the method proposed by the teacher. 
Since the children’s ‘discovered’ method and the (unspecified, but unused) teacher’s 
method are mathematically equivalent, we wonder whether Lave generally neglects 
the fact that mathematics frequently provides a plurality of equivalent procedures for 
solving any problem. For example, shoppers in supermarkets may not use certain 
paper-and-pencil place-holding arithmetic procedures, but this does not necessarily 
imply that they do not calculate in the way that they have been taught in school, since 
an understanding of the equivalence of many arithmetic procedures is an integral part 
of what they have been taught (see also Lynch, 1995, p. 599, endnote 20). Using a 
multiplication table ‘in reverse’ is no ‘outlaw’ mathematical technique, but a perfectly 
sound one. There is certainly nothing mathematically invalid about using a 
multiplication table to solve division problems. Of course, this technique may be 
temporarily prohibited in a classroom exercise, for example for educational purposes 
if the teacher wants pupils to move from familiar techniques to unfamiliar ones. 
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Lave seems to give little attention to what teachers are specifically trying to do when 
they teach a new method.  As already mentioned, according to Lave schools are trying 
to ‘replace’ (informal) children’s methods by (formal) teachers’ methods: 
[It] is a widespread assumption that it is the responsibility of schooling to 
replace the (presumably) faulty and inefficient mathematical knowledge 
acquired by people in the real world. (p. 318; emphasis in original) 
However, if one gives up the notion that there can only be one method, then one can 
see that schools are not necessarily trying to ‘replace’ existing methods (if they 
produce mathematically correct results, e.g., addition using fingers), but rather are 
trying to expand the range of methods.  Lave’s case may actually represent a readily 
recognisable and commonplace teaching situation, one in which teachers face the 
problem of leveraging the learning of a new technique, which at first may be more 
difficult and cumbersome than methods already learned. Therefore the pupils may 
find it preferable to use existing methods rather than struggle with the new one.  It 
may be for that reason that already learned methods are temporarily prohibited 
(without thereby implying that the previous methods are not mathematically sound). 
One might make an analogy with practice sessions of a basketball team.  The coach 
might, as an educational exercise, prohibit players from using their strong hand to 
dribble in order to improve dribbling with the weaker hand. Alternatively, the coach 
might, in order to improve passing the ball and to teach players to be in a position to 
receive a pass, have a training match where no dribbling is allowed.  In both of these 
cases, players know that dribbling-with-your-weak-hand and playing-without-
dribbling are not techniques that are supposed to replace their existing ones, but are 
‘training’ techniques (since players would not play a ‘real’ match without dribbling). 
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Lave seems to be puzzled by the fact that neither dieters nor shoppers, who have all 
been to school and therefore have supposedly learned ‘school algorithms’, use these 
algorithms to solve the arithmetic problems they encounter in their everyday lives.  
Why is this surprising? Because she further assumes that “[s]chool algorithms should 
be more powerful and accurate than quick, informal procedures (that’s why they are 
taught in school)” (Lave, 1988, p. 57). However, this seems to be a 
mischaracterisation of school algorithms, which – on this we agree with Lave – are 
‘over-powerful’ for many practical affairs.   
We would argue that school algorithms are not taught in order to improve the 
arithmetic calculations that pupils can already perform (e.g., as part of playing cards 
or checking the change in a shop), but to expand their computational resources 
(which, incidentally, implies that not every pupil will actually use these new resources 
outside school – but then a lot of what is taught in school is potentially ‘unsuccessful’ 
in that sense). Place-holding algorithms are not more ‘powerful’ in every situation for 
every problem, but rather are more powerful in the range of problems that they can be 
used for.  Try to calculate in your head how much money you will have in five years 
if you save 50 pounds every month at an interest rate of 4.6 per cent (not forgetting 
compound interest).  Paper-and-pencil algorithms are more powerful in the sense that 
they can be applied to that kind of problem, and if one was looking to see whether 
people ever used such methods, supermarket shopping and diet portion preparation 
would not be the places to look for them. 
In sum, it seems to us that Lave’s way of characterising the observed practices is 
misleading, since it may suggest that the way the teacher wanted children to solve the 
problem and the way that children actually solved them (or the school-taught place-
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holding algorithm and the kind of mental arithmetic employed by shoppers) are in an 
important sense in conflict or contradiction (see Greiffenhagen and Sharrock, 2006, 
for a related discussion with respect to mathematical relativism). We have tried to 
show that rather than assuming that school mathematics aims to replace one 
arithmetic procedure with another, we could see school mathematics as teaching, inter 
alia, the equivalence of different methods (e.g., using pen-and-paper algorithms to 
check mental computations). 
What is ‘real’ mathematics? 
While we have argued that Lave’s findings do not point to the existence of two 
different kinds of mathematics (‘school’ and ‘everyday’), this leaves the possibility 
that schools may teach a different attitude towards mathematics than that acquired as 
part of everyday practices.  Lave’s studies of everyday mathematics seem to follow in 
the footsteps of neo-Marxist critical theories (cf., Pea 1991, p. 488; Gourlay, 1999, p. 
481; Contu and Willmott, 2003, p. 285; Henning, 2004, p. 153) in assuming that 
people may be ideologically confused about their own abilities and needs (here: their 
mathematical competences). In other words, it may be through the ‘hidden 
curriculum’ (Illich, 1971) of school mathematics that some children are socialised into 
compliance with socially subordinate statuses. Studies of everyday mathematics can 
then be seen as attempts to ‘enlighten’ everyday users of their own competences. 
We base this view on Lave’s discussion of the shoppers’ self-characterisation of their 
use of arithmetic in the supermarket.  Shoppers apologised for not doing ‘real math’ – 
which puzzles Lave, since it seems to contradict the fact that shoppers were extremely 
successful at ‘supermarket math’ (remember: “virtually error free”): 
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Researchers in the Adult Math Project discovered that all participants had 
poor opinions of their arithmetic practices in everyday settings.  They 
apologized for not doing what they called ‘real maths’ – the math taught in 
school.  This is especially interesting in the face of their extraordinary 
arithmetic efficacy in kitchen and supermarket. (Lave, 1985, p. 174; 
emphasis in original) 
Lave seems to think that shoppers’ self-image results from school ideology placing 
undue emphasis on mathematics, thereby instilling a belief that people are unable to 
do mathematics: 
Jpfs [just plain folks] who are not mathematicians appear to take away 
from school the belief that they don’t know and are unable to do ‘real 
mathematics’.  They are unaware of their own abilities. (Lave et al., 1989, 
p. 68)5 
This claim is cited and propagated in the literature.  For example, Millroy (1992, p. 3) 
cites it and reports that “the carpenters did not consider their work to have much to do 
with ‘real’ mathematics” (p. 158). Lave’s and Millroy’s argument seems to be 
something like this: schools place exclusive emphasis on one kind of arithmetic 
procedure (place-holding algorithms), which is thereby taken to define ‘real’ 
mathematics. Since many people have problems with this kind of procedure in school, 
they believe that they are unable to do mathematics – despite the fact that they are 
able to solve the arithmetic problems they encounter in everyday life. Lave sees in 
                                                 
5 See also Lave et al. (1982, p. 45), Lave (1986a, p. 104), Lave (1986b, p. 147), and Lave (1988, p. 
183). 
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this a demonstration of a ‘false consciousness’: “They are unaware of their own 
abilities.”6 
Lave finds further evidence for her view in the aforementioned study of “math 
practice in school classrooms”. Since for Lave there is a clear contrast between 
children’s ‘own’ methods (that they have discovered in order to solve the problem) 
and the teacher’s ‘official’ method (to which children have to conform), children 
experience the difference between ‘real’ and ‘other’ math already in school: 
[…] by working out answers using their own techniques and then 
translating them into acceptable classroom form on their worksheets, the 
children generated a powerful categorical distinction for themselves 
between ‘real’ and ‘other’ math. It is not necessary to search beyond the 
classroom for the generation of this distinction. (Lave, 1990, p. 322) 
Lave’s way of characterising the situation implies a strong opposition between 
children’s ‘own’ method and the teacher’s ‘official’ method. Since schools are seen to 
                                                 
6 There is an interesting tension on this point in Lave’s work. On the one hand, Lave wants to argue 
that ‘just plain folks’ are extremely efficacious in the conduct of their everyday lives; on the other 
hand, Lave treats them as incompetent in knowing what they are doing and often rejects the self-
characterisations of ‘just plain folks’, since for Lave these only show that ‘just plain folks’ are victims 
of ideology and therefore unaware of the true extent of their own abilities. Ordinary people, for Lave, 
are smarter than her academic and professional opponents acknowledge (since they solve all kinds of 
everyday problems), but they are not smart enough to recognise for themselves what Lave’s studies 
attempt to show, namely, that they are smarter than they themselves believe. As Lave (1988, p. 191, 
endnote 1) puts it: “The term ‘just plain folks’ (jpfs) will be used throughout the text. A double irony is 
intended: on the colonialist’s distance and condescension that plagues psychology only slightly more 
subtly than anthropology […] and on the belief of jpfs that the rubric is appropriate” (our emphasis). 
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aim to replace the former by the latter, it seems that children are alienated in schools: 
it is only the teacher’s method that counts as ‘real’ mathematics, while the children’s 
method is being dismissed. 
We have already expressed our doubts whether schools really try to ‘replace’ one kind 
of procedure with another, as well as whether the children’s methods are ‘their own’ 
in the strong sense Lave implies, but here want to give an alternative interpretation of 
why shoppers and carpenters apologize for not doing ‘real’ mathematics. Far from 
being an ideologically distorted underestimation of their own arithmetic abilities, we 
could see this as simply a way of saying that grocery shopping and carpentry involves 
very little mathematics (as demonstrated in Murtaugh’s tables) and that the few 
calculations that occur are relatively simple in comparison to some of the arithmetic 
problems encountered in school. While Lave translates shoppers’ denials that they do 
‘real’ mathematics into a denial that they do any mathematics, the carpenters’ 
response to Millroy’s question gives us a different way of interpreting this denial: 
I inquired, “Don’t you do any maths in this workshop?” The response was 
quick. “Oh no! Maybe a bit of adding and multiplying, but that’s not real 
maths!” and he walked off. (Millroy, 1992, p. 101) 
In our view, the shoppers and carpenters are ‘apologizing’ to the researcher for the 
fact that the researcher will not be able to observe many instances of what they, the 
shoppers, imagine to be the ‘real’ mathematics the researcher is hoping to see.  
However, such a characterisation is not based on shoppers’ or carpenters’ conviction 
that they do no mathematics (which could be countered by showing that they do 
perform some mathematics), but rather on a distinction between ‘pretty basic’ 
perfunctory mathematics (that pretty much anyone can perform, often without going 
to school) and more ‘difficult’ and ‘elaborate’ mathematics (that is taught in later 
Page 34 of 40 
Greiffenhagen, C. and W. Sharrock (2008). School mathematics and its everyday other? Revisiting 
Lave's 'Cognition in Practice'. Educational Studies in Mathematics 69 (1), 1-21. 
 
schooling and everyone finds harder to master).  Lave effectively portrays the 
shoppers as involved in an ideologically induced self-abasement (writing off their 
own manifest competence in mathematics), but it is equally plausible to allow 
shoppers a perfectly accurate understanding of their situation: the shoppers 
acknowledge that grocery shopping is – despite the role of money – only marginally a 
‘mathematical’ operation and that the few calculations that occur are normally very 
basic and of the sort that pretty much anyone can do (involving only the most minimal 
mathematical ‘workings out’).  The status ‘not real’ mathematics does therefore not 
imply the denial of any mathematical status to, for example, a bit of adding and 
multiplying, but rather locates it as marginal relative to heavy-duty practice (denying 
the status ‘real football’ to some idle kicking around of a ball does not deny that, in a 
basic sense, it can be called football).   
As mentioned above, Lave’s aim seems to ‘enlighten’ shoppers:  
We might relieve those in charge of mathematics problem-solving 
instruction in school of the burden of teaching mathematics as preparation 
for their everyday lives. In so doing we might relieve pupils of the belief 
that what they do in everyday situations is of no value. If they were able to 
recognize the inventiveness of their own practice, it might also help to 
mitigate the belief that only geniuses can discover and invent 
mathematics. (Lave et al., 1989, pp. 68-69) 
We think that Lave, despite her emphasis on studying the ‘academic hinterland’ 
(Lave, 1988, p. 3), and on complementing the intelligence of ‘just plains folks’, 
nonetheless treats them as ‘dopes’ (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 68). In her data we find no 
evidence that shoppers have a problem with their arithmetic ability in the 
supermarket.  That people regard their grocery shopping as routine and the 
calculations that they do there as not real mathematics requires a considerable stretch 
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to be converted into the sweepingly generalised conviction that  “what they do in 
everyday situations is of no value”.    
We also think that it is misleading to characterise the shoppers or tailors as having 
‘discovered’ or ‘invented’ new mathematics.  It is one thing to counter the view that 
only people who are good at formal (school) mathematics are intelligent (i.e., to use 
mathematics as the sole indicator of rationality), but is quite another to argue that 
shoppers and carpenters are as good as professional mathematicians at doing 
mathematics.  People can be said to be ingenious and inventive in finding practical 
solutions (‘my rice cup’) for the problems they encounter, but this does not mean that 
their solutions are that ingenious (unless you start off with the view that people are 
astonishingly dim) or constitute a contribution to mathematics. There is a world of 
difference between making variably inventive applications of basic standard systems 
of computation (such as elementary arithmetic) and developing new procedures of 
computation. 
Conclusion 
We have tried, using the exhibited materials taken from a series of classic studies of 
everyday mathematics, to raise some questions about the concept of ‘everyday 
mathematics’ and have tried to show why it is necessary to separate a variety of 
differences.  ‘Everyday mathematics’ as it is found in Lave’s studies and, we would 
argue, in other comparable studies, appears to postulate two different kinds of 
reasoning, those of a ‘formal’ sort which are taught in school, and those of an 
‘informal’ sort which grow up wild (to borrow from Levi-Strauss).  We hold that this 
postulate is stretched, if not invalid, depending on a very narrow interpretation of 
‘what is taught in school’ contrasting with a very liberal one of what is ‘developed 
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independently of school mathematics’.  We do not deny the differences between the 
two situations, for example, between doing formal school tests (at one pole) and   
supermarket shopping or carpentry (at the other), but argue that the differences are 
precisely there: in the situations.  The examples illustrate that the demands for 
computation in practical affairs such as supermarket shopping are few, limited and, 
often, inconsequential (e.g., that the sums involved are not economically very 
significant to the shoppers).  
The school/everyday contrast imagines (it does not demonstrate) that the pencil-and-
paper place-holding algorithm is taught in schools as if to absolutely prohibit all other 
practical decision making considerations (showing the danger of identifying teaching 
the solving of specific mathematical problems with teaching a particular method as 
the method of problem solving).  It is at least possible to think that the place-holder 
method is taught as a fall back method, and one which, like other problem solving 
methods, can be used in a ‘good sense’ way, one which does not necessarily or 
automatically prioritise exacting numerical determinations over the situation’s 
requirements for, e.g., a rough approximation. In sum, whilst acknowledging the 
existence of different procedures to solve arithmetic problems, we have questioned 
whether the differences between them are mathematical differences, whether the latter 
should really be seen as an autonomous system, and whether schools really teach the 
exclusive use of the former while everyday situations are the sole proprietors of the 
latter. 
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